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Abstract
We analyse the possible impact of EMU enlargement on inﬂation rates in the ac-
cession countries. We establish two main points: ﬁrst, using a theoretical model
we show that if large initial differences in price levels occur, even under very
favourable circumstances the optimal path for price adjustments should be asym-
metric, i.e. occuring mostly in the candidate countries. Second, based on data from
the German reuniﬁcation we quantify the inﬂationary effect of price level conver-
gence in the accession countries. Our ﬁndings indicate that (trend) inﬂation rates
in the EMU candidate countries are likely to increase sharply, whereas the impact
on the current euro area is likely to be small, albeit not negligible. Our results sup-
port the need to allow for some ﬂexibility in the exchange rate arrangements with
the candidate countries to facilitate gradual price level convergence prior to EMU
enlargement.
Keywords: Price level differences, convergence, EMU enlargement
JEL codes: E50
1 Introduction
One of the hopes surrounding the introduction of the euro was that as transparency
increases among the EMU members, prices will converge. Casual inspection shows
that the euro area currently shares the same currency, but not similar product prices
(see table 1). Differences in price levels between countries tend to equalise, but the
adjustment can be very slow (Froot and Rogers, 1995). If price levels converge within
a currency area, they result in differences in inﬂation rates. As the differences in price
levels between the euro area and the accession countries far exceeds price level dif-
ferences within the euro area, this potential cause of inﬂation differentials could be
relevant in the context of EMU enlargement. Based on economic reasoning, we might
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1Germany France Italy Spain Greece
Coca Cola 0.33l 0.30 0.37 0.77 0.32 0.39
Nivea 150ml 2.04 2.21 2.76 1.79 2.27
Levis 501 Jeans 97.95 73.00 79.53 61.11 67.20
McDonald’s Big Mac - 2.97 2.53 2.49 2.11
Kinder Surprise 0.55 - 0.59 0.63 0.46
Source: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27.12.2001.
Table 1: Price differentials for selected goods (prices in euro)
expect that due to arbitrage prices for tradable goods converge faster than for nontrad-
able goods. But due to lack of sectoral inﬂation data for many accession countries,
the factors driving price level convergence are difﬁcult to assess. How will price level
convergence come about? Put differently, which prices are likely to rise when? And
should the Single European monetary policy react – and if so, how?
Aim of this paper is to explore the link between price level convergence and inﬂa-
tion differentials. The German experience after the reuniﬁcation might shed some light
on these issues: At the time East and West Germany decided to form a currency union,
considerable differences in price levels existed. We present a theoretical model to in-
vestigate the optimal monetary policy response in such a situation and using detailed
data on regional inﬂation rates we show how price level convergence came about. As it
turns out the monetary policy reaction is in line with our model, since the central bank
aimed at keeping inﬂation low for the entire currency area. Given the nominal rigidi-
ties of the German economy, this implied high inﬂation in East Germany. Based on this
analysis, we make inferences about price level convergence in an enlarged euro area.
To preview the conclusions, we ﬁnd that the impact of EMU enlargement on inﬂation
in the euro area is small, but not negligible, but that inﬂation rates in the candidate
countries are likely to increase considerably and for a sustained period.
The paper proceeds as follows: the next section outlines the relationship between
price level convergence and inﬂation dispersion. Section 3 contains our empirical re-
sults for Germany, section 4 computes the effect of EMU enlargement on future and
current EMU members. The policy implications are summarised in section 5. The ﬁnal
section concludes.
2 Inﬂation differentials and price level convergence
2.1 The law of one price
According to the law of one price ‘... absent natural or governmental barriers, a com-
modity should sell for the same price everywhere. The mechanism supposedly enforc-
2ing the law of one price is arbitrage’ (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996).1 Following the law
of one price, price differences between tradable goods sold in different locations should
be fairly small, provided that market separation is not possible and product regulations
are similar.
Froot and Rogoff (2001) have shown that the strict interpretation of the law of one
price does not hold, and according to Engel and Rogers (1996) price levels can differ
within a currency union. This ﬁnding also holds for the euro area price levels: using
evidence from bar code scanner data collected from supermarkets, the European Com-
mission (2001) states that ‘price dispersion inside every Member State is always lower
than price differences across countries for the same products. Generally, prices inside
Member States vary 5 per cent round the national average; across the EU, prices vary
20 per cent or more.’2 However, the differences within the euro area are decreasing:
empirical studies have shown that price levels of tradable goods are converging in the
euro area, and for a number of goods currently price level differences between certain
cities in the euro area are not higher than in the US. Still, overall price level dispersion
are still greater in the euro area (Rogers 2001).
There are a number of factors why price levels can differ across countries or re-
gions within a currency area. The most important causes are differences in cyclical
phases, differences in wage behaviour, product regulations, productivity or consumer
preferences and inﬂation expectations. The Balassa-Samuelson effect is also widely
cited: according to this effect catching-up countries might experience relatively high
inﬂation rates, as productivity increases in the tradable goods sector outpace produc-
tivity increases in the nontradables sector. If similar wages are paid in both sectors,
overall inﬂation will rise due to high inﬂation rates in the nontradable goods sector.3
However, as Broda (2002) has shown, the BS effect might contribute to differences in
price levels, but cannot be the only reason why price levels differ.4
1Note, however, that Campa and Wolf (1997) only ﬁnd very limited support for correlations between real
exchange rates and trade ﬂows, which could imply that if price convergence takes place, it does not occur
via arbitrage. Krugman (?) opposes this view, pointing out that the threat of competition can be sufﬁcient
for ﬁrms to equalise prices.
2This coincides with anecdotal evidence: ‘A VW Golf IV that sells for EUR 13.588 in Belgium fetches
EUR18.801inIreland, OpiumEaudeToilettecostsEUR112.30inBelgiumbutonlyEUR50.23inPortugal;
and an IMac ‘Indigo’ computer will set you back EUR 1.731 in Greece, but only EUR 1.159 in Germany.
... You pay only 50 European cent for the same 20 Bayer Aspirin tablets in Greece that cost EUR 4.67 in
France...’ (Wall Street Journal, 11.1.2002).
3The theoretical foundation is given in Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964). Estimates of the Balassa-
Samuelson effect for the accession countries are found in Cih´ ak and Holub (2001), de Broeck and Slok
(2001) and Back´ e at al. (2002).
4Broda (2002) uses the example of Panama and Colombia: ‘the price level of Panama in 1990 was 60
percent that of the US, while Colombia’s price level was less than 30 percent that of the US. This difference
cannot be explained by the conventional Balassa-Samuelson effect ... because Panama and Colombia had
similar income levels in 1990.’ Moreover, one of the assumptions of the Balassa-Samuelson framework is
that for tradable goods no prices levels differences exist between the candidate countries and the euro area.
Detailed, disaggregated price level data for the candidate countries are often not available, yet the evidence
presented by Cih´ ak and Holub (2001) implicitly refutes this core assumption of the Balassa-Samuelson
model: ‘...signiﬁcant parts of the traditional “tradable” commodities (such as most foodstuffs, nonalcoholic
beverages, clothing, ﬂoor coverings, home applicances etc.) are at 45-75 percent of the German level.’
3As a main explanation for differences in price levels in the euro area the Euro-
pean Commission puts forward ‘economic’ factors such as industry or product-speciﬁc
differences in manufacturer or distribution concentration or regulatory differences (as
opposed to geographic factors such as transport costs, different consumption patterns
or income differences).5 From the perspective of an economist inﬂation differentials
are in these cases ‘benign’, as the different prices reﬂect differences in underlying cost
structures.
The ﬂipside of this argument is that in a currency area, a single monetary policy
applies to all participating regions or countries. The common central bank has to focus
on price stability in the entire currency area and cannot respond to divergence of inﬂa-
tion rates. If one or more countries exhibit a positive inﬂation differential, to meet the
desired inﬂation target of the currency area all other countries need to have inﬂation
rates below the overall inﬂation target. Therefore, persistent deviation from the overall
inﬂation target should be avoided. The same holds, of course, if a country joins an
existing monetary union, but is likely to have structurally higher inﬂation rates because
of lack of initial convergence. In other words, inﬂation differentials are only warranted
to the extent that they contribute to allocative efﬁciency, but can impose costs on other
members of the currency union if they result because of lack of (initial) convergence or
because of inappropriate national economic policies.
The point of initial convergence can become relevant in the context of EMU ac-
cession. The main argument why price levels differ less within a currency area than
between currency areas is that having a currency of one’s own can have similar effect
as other barriers to trade. This point was made by Engel and Rogers (1999), who com-
pared variability of the real exchange rate between cities in the US on the one hand
and US and Canadian cities on the other: their results could imply that if two countries
decide to form a monetary union, the real exchange rate variability should be reduced
by more than the nominal exchange rate variability. The results of Weber and Beck
(2003) indicate that under EMU the elimination of nominal exchange rate volatility
has largely, but not completely reduced both border and distance effects. If the same
holds for the enlarged EMU, some form of price convergence between the current and
future EMU members needs to take place.
2.2 The optimal inﬂation rate
If two countries with differences in price levels decide to form a monetary union, what
is the impact for aggregate inﬂation? As the exchange rate disappears, price level con-
vergence can either be achieved via an upward price adjustment in the country with the
lower initial price level, or via a downward price adjustment in the ‘expensive’ mem-
5The IMF concluded that steady-state inﬂation rates to achieve full convergence in price levels over a
period of 10 years within the euro area could differ up to 2.7 percentage points (IMF, 2002).
4ber (both price adjustments can also occur simultaneously).6 If the ﬁrms’ production
capacities in the ‘cheap’ countries face – at least in the short run – capacity restric-
tions, prices might rise in the ‘cheap’ country: After joining an existing currency area,
individual ﬁrms in the new, ‘cheap’ member countries may not continue to supply the
consumers in their country, they can also distribute their products in other countries of
the currency area.
Then, these ﬁrms face the following decision: Do they continue to supply local
customers at a relatively low price, or do they ship their products to the other member
countries of the currency union, where the price level is higher? In the latter case, they
can ask a higher price, but face additional transportation costs. If the transportation
costs do not exceed the potential beneﬁts resulting from selling at higher prices in the
‘expensive’ countries, a rational manager will opt for the second option. This limits
the supply of ‘cheap’ goods in the ‘cheap’ country, which can lead to increasing prices.
This indicates why arbitrage may lead to lower prices at the aggregate level, but not
necessarily to lower (or constant) prices in all participating countries of the currency
area.
The main point we want to establish in the section is that if large differences in price
levels within a currency union lead to convergence of price levels, optimising central
banks must allow for relatively high inﬂation in the ‘cheap’ countries, in order to pre-
vent deﬂation in the ‘expensive’ countries. Abstracting from differences in monetary
transmission, different types of rigidities etc., we show that the inﬂation differential
between the countries can be related to the relative size of the two countries and the
speed of the price adjustment.7
To establish this result we present the full version of a (highly simpliﬁed) model
in appendix B. We sketch the outline of the model here. The model assumes a world
consisting of two countries. The initial price level in country A is lower than in country
B (due to a lack of market integration at the outset). The economies have standard
Lucas supply curves. They experience downward nominal wage rigidity. Then trade
barriers are lifted. As a result, there is a (not instantaneous, but staggered) convergence
to the law of one price. As soon as trade barriers are lifted, both countries also enter
a currency union. The common central bank aims at stable output growth and stable
prices.
Based on this setting, the optimal path of price adjustment, reﬂected in the inﬂation
rates in individual countries and the area as a whole, is as follows:
6It is implicitly assumed that the price level for the monetary union as a whole is roughly stable.
7While we cannot exclude the possibility that this result could change if we allow for differences in


































t are the inﬂation rates in the countries A and B, respectively. We see
that inﬂation in country A – the country with low initial prices – is positive, whereas
the inﬂation rate in the initially ‘expensive’ country is negative. However, area-wide
inﬂation π∗
t is positive, which implies that the optimal price adjustment is asymmetric
(i.e. prices rise more in country A than they fall in country B). The optimal path
for price level convergence depends on the initial price level difference between both
countries (pB
t−1− pA
t−1), the relative size of country A (k, with 0 < k < 1
2), the speed of
price adjustment (α, more formally: the share of ﬁrms adjusting prices in each period),
the degree of price rigidities (β) and the relative weight of inﬂation in the common
central bank’s loss function (γ).
• If the economic size of country A is relatively small compared to country B (i.e.
k small), then it is optimal from the common central bank’s point of view that
the burden of price adjustment will fall mostly upon country A.
• The area-wide inﬂation is increasing in β: If the output loss associated with
deﬂation is high, the central bank will raise area-wide inﬂation (and accept the
loss related to a higher inﬂation rate in country A) in order to reduce the deﬂation
rate in country B.
• The area-wide inﬂation rate is increasing in the initial price level difference be-
tween both regions (pB
t−1 − pA
t−1) and in the speed of the price adjustment pro-
cess, α. The area-wide inﬂation is decreasing in γ, i.e. the weight of inﬂation in
the central bank’s loss function (relative to output).
These results can be applied to EMU enlargement in a very straightforward man-
ner: if the accession countries join the EMU without having achieved price level con-
vergence prior to EMU accession, inevitable price adjustments need to occur in the ac-
cession countries, for two reasons: First, as the economic weight of the current member
states is almost twenty times that of the accession countries, a sizeable price decline in
the current member states would be incompatible with price stability in the enlarged
area. Second, a decline in the general price level (i.e. deﬂation) in the current member
states may cause substantial output losses in those countries. The policy implication
6is that the ECB should allow for temporarily high inﬂation in the candidate member
states, in order to facilitate price level convergence.
In what follows we ﬁrst look at price level convergence following the German re-
uniﬁcation. Based on these ﬁndings we then analyse the possible impact of EMU
enlargement on inﬂation in the euro area and in the candidate countries.
3 The German reuniﬁcation
Existing currency areas can provide information about price adjustment within a cur-
rency area, whereas international studies estimate deviation of price levels between
countries. Both types of evidence, however, need not fully capture the situation of
EMU enlargement, where two groups of countries with large initial price differences
decide to form a monetary union. A comparable situation occurred in the early 1990s,
when East and West German reunited.8
Weusethishistoricalevidenceandanalyseconvergenceofpricelevelsandinﬂation
rates after the German reuniﬁcation. As in our model East and West Germany differed
considerably in economic size (in terms of population East Germany is about 1/4 the
size of West Germany and even smaller in terms of economic weight) and wages were
downward rigid. We will show that asymmetric price adjustment – which was opti-
mal according to our simple model – was also observed in practice in Germany after
the reuniﬁcation. Our results will then be used in our calculations of the impact of
EMU enlargement on the current and future euro area members. Moreover, we provide
empirical data on convergence of price levels between different CPI components after
the German reuniﬁcation, to give an idea how price level convergence might unfold in
practice, i.e. to illustrate the different speed of adjustment per CPI component.
3.1 Convergence of price levels
Data on price level differences within Germany is relatively scarce. The German
Federal Statistical Ofﬁce (the Statistisches Bundesamt) has published an analysis in
September 1993, comparing price levels in 50 East and West German cities.9 The
main results of this study are summarised in table 2: the three top rows show average
ﬁgures for East and West Germany. In the lower part of the table we show the max-
imum and minimum observations at the city level and the resulting maximum price
level differences.10 According to this study, price levels in West German cities were
8A brief overview about the German reuniﬁcation is given in appendix A.
9See Statistisches Bundesamt (1994). Until the late 1990s different consumption baskets have been used
for both parts of Germany, which impedes direct comparison, as in particular the ‘basic needs’ such as
nutrition, clothing, energy and water had larger expenditure shares in the budget of East Germans than in the
West.
10In all tables the maximum difference (the ‘spread’) indicates by how many percent prices were higher
in West Germany than in East Germany.
7All Durable Non-durable
items Food Utilities Services goods goods
CPI weight 100.0 26.2 7.5 26.9 35.2 37.8
Av. West Germany 100.0 99.5 108.7 99.6 98.6 101.5
Av. East Germany 94.2 91.7 102.1 85.6 98.5 96.2
Av. spread (%) 6.1 8.5 6.5 16.4 0.1 5.5
Max. West Germany 103.1 104.8 116.5 109.1 100.0 104.7
Min. East Germany 91.4 86.8 93.3 78.1 97.0 94.5
Max. spread (%) 13.5 20.8 26.6 40.0 3.1 10.8
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (1994) and own calculations
Table 2: Average and maximum price level differences between East and West Ger-
many in 1993
on average about 6 percent higher in 1993 than in East Germany, but with considerable
variation at the city level (the maximum difference of the All items CPI amounts to
13.5% in 1993). Compared with differences in price levels prior to the reuniﬁcation
this is actually quite low, but essentially the result of the 1:1 exchange rate.11
Distinguishing between sectors, the following emerges: On average, price level dif-
ferences between East and West Germany in 1993 were small for durable consumption
goods, whereasprices for non-durable consumption goodson average differedby about
5 percent between both regions. The highest price level differences can be observed in
the service sector, where the differences on average amount to roughly 16 percent. This
indicates that initial price level differences were larger for nontradable goods than for
tradable goods. Finally, rents (which were not included in the study) were on average
about 35% lower in East than in West Germany, which should further reduce the costs
of living in East Germany, relative to West Germany.12
Using the price level data from September 1993 and the inﬂation rate per CPI cate-
gory the initial price level differences in 1991 can be calculated. For the All Items CPI
the difference between East and West Germany price levels amount to almost 30% (see
the last column in table 3). However, the aggregate ﬁgures hide considerable variation
in price level differences between sectors (the initial difference for the CPI Utilities, for
instance, is over 140%). This is clearly the result of the distorted price system of the
former East German regime, where prices did not always reﬂect underlying costs. All
in all, it is probably safe to say that price differences in 1991 were almost 30% between
East and West Germany.
How far have price levels converged? Using East and West inﬂation data we can
compute aggregate price levels in East and West in 2002. The last row of table 3 reveals
that current price level differences between the two parts have been reduced to about
11Recall that market exchange rates prior to the reuniﬁcation were considerably lower, i.e. about 100 East
German Mark for 12.5 West German Mark (see Appendix A). Under such an exchange rate regime, price
level differences would have been considerably larger.
12See Statistisches Bundesamt (1994).
8CPI All Items West Germany East Germany Spread (in %)
1/1991 90.6 70.3 28.8
7/1993 100.0 94.2 6.2
7/2002 115.5 111.0 4.0
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (1994) and own calculations
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Figure 1: Inﬂation rate dispersion in East and West Germany
4% (CPI All items). This implies that initial price differences of almost 30% at the
aggregate level have been reduced to about 6% within two years and 4% at the end of
the ten-year period.
3.2 Convergence of inﬂation rates
In ﬁgure 1 CPI inﬂation (All Items) for both parts of the country are plotted. We
can broadly distinguish two periods: From 1991 to 1995 substantial differences in
inﬂation rates are observable. Since 1995 these differences in headline inﬂation rates
have almost completely vanished.13
Using a time series (East German CPI inﬂation) minus (West German CPI inﬂa-
tion), we test when this series no longer systematically deviates from zero. Table 4
13We have also checked whether the fact that the weights of the different sub-components of CPI inﬂation
differed in both parts of Germany critically inﬂuences our results. The differences between the ‘regular’ East
German CPI and East German inﬂation rates, computed with West German consumption weights, are very
small. Therefore, the main differences between East and West German inﬂation were driven by underlying
price increases, not by different weighting schemes.
9Sample: 1992:01 1996:01 Sample: 1996:01 2002:09
Variable Coefﬁcient P-value Coefﬁcient P-value
C 28.6 0.43 1.2 0.64
T −0.3 0.00 0.0 0.65
Oilprice −0.3 0.36 0.0 0.32
Real exchange rate −0.1 0.76 0.0 0.80
AR(1) 0.8 0.00 0.9 0.00
AR(2) −0.3 0.88 0.0 0.91
AR(3) −0.21 0.21 0.0 0.82
R2 0.77 0.84
Adj. R2 0.74 0.83
S.E. 2.37 0.17
Source: Own calculations
Table 4: CPI inﬂation rate convergence
reveals that in a regression from 1996 onwards14 neither the constant, not time trend
coefﬁcient differs signiﬁcantly from zero. The only signiﬁcant coefﬁcient is an AR(1)
error term, which implies that the time series exhibits a certain degree of stickiness. All
together we can say that price level convergence came to a – at least temporary – halt
after about 5.5 years. By January 1996 the differences in the CPI All Items had been
reduced to 4.2%. This implies that once the (aggregate) price level differences were
reduced to about 5%, price level convergence has not progressed substantially.
The model of section 2.2 postulates that in the presence of nominal rigidities the
price level adjustment should be asymmetrical. In that case, prices in the ‘more ex-
pensive’ region do not fall, but the central bank accommodates high inﬂation in the
‘cheaper’ region. Since the main characteristics of our model were present in the Ger-
man case (i.e. large differences in size and downward rigidity in wages), was the
reaction of the Bundesbank when confronted with high inﬂation rates in East Germany
after the reuniﬁcation compatible with the results of our model? If that is the case
inﬂation in West Germany should have hardly accelerated since 1990.
To test for the impact on the reuniﬁcation on West German inﬂation we regressed
the West German CPI on a simple time dummy and ran a Chow test to test for structural
breaks.15 To get good estimates we covered a period of 20 years, such that roughly
10 years before and after the reuniﬁcation are included in our sample, as breakpoint
we use January 1991. Table 5 reveals that the null hypothesis of a structural break
is rejected.16 This implies that West German inﬂation did not increase or decrease
due to the reuniﬁcation. This indicates that price level adjustments have not lead to
structurally lower inﬂation in West Germany.
14Different sample periods have been tested, but this ‘breakpoint’ delivered the best results. The time
series is stationary. Leaving out the variables ‘oilprice’ and ‘real exchange rate’ do not qualitatively change
our results.
15The ADF test rejects the hypothesis of a unit root in the West German CPI series.
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Figure 3: Nontradables inﬂation differential
11Sample period: 1981-2001; Test for breakpoint in 1991
F-statistic 2.15 Probability 0.14
Log likelihood ratio 2.16 Probability 0.14
Source: Own calculations
Table 5: Chow test for structural break in the West German CPI
To analyse inﬂation developments we plot the developments of all CPI categories.
Figure 2 and ﬁgure 3 plots the inﬂation differentials between East and West Germany
for tradable and nontradable goods, respectively.17 We observe that inﬂation differ-
entials in tradables are small, relative to inﬂation differentials in nontradable goods.
Housing costs and rents paid for housing account for the largest price increases (more
than 100 percent on an annual basis), but have been below 5 per cent since 1997.18
Moreover, even 5 years after the reuniﬁcation inﬂation differentials for certain CPI cat-
egories(notablyHealthServicesandEducation)arestillaroundorabove10percentage
points. This indicates that price level convergence for these categories occurs only very
slowly.19 Finally, table 6 summarises the yearly inﬂation differential between East and
West Germany for selected CPI components.
All in all, we can thus conclude that it took between 1 and 5 years for most East
German CPI components to adjust to the higher West German price levels. In what
follows we apply these ﬁndings to EMU enlargement.
4 The consequences of EMU enlargement
Following section 2.1, price level differences between the current euro area and the ac-
cession countries can partly be related to the fact that they have different currencies. If
the candidate countries adopt the euro, this (implicit) barrier to trade is removed, pos-
sibly initiating further convergence of price levels. As the price level in the candidate
countries is currently below its euro area equivalent, this could result in a positive trend
17Note that not all East German inﬂation rate series go back to 1991. However, the differences between
the different regional inﬂation rates in East Germany is very small (details available upon request). We have
therefore decided to concentrate on the East German region, where a maximum of data is available, i.e.
Brandenburg. The ﬁgures 2 and 3 do not show East German inﬂation rates, but Brandenburg inﬂation rates.
This region represents about 19% of East Germany, both in terms of GDP and population.
18Housing rents in the former GDR were essentially based on a system dating from 1936, which set a
ﬁxed rent for state-owned property (based on this system the rents were increased for the last time in 1981).
After the reuniﬁcation, rents in East Germany were considerably lower than in West Germany (more than the
factor 10), so for social reasons special transition arrangements applied until the end of the 1990s. During
this transition period rents could periodically be increased, normally at the beginning of the year. Newly
build homes were treated differently, and as they were generally more attractive, the old houses became
increasing unpopular. This explains why until the mid-1990s spikes in housing inﬂation can be observed,
but the spikes become less pronounced, as more and more people moved to newly build houses, where rents
could be increased in a more ﬂexible way. By 1995 the East German housing rent system had been changed
to the West German system, though the level of rents was still somewhat lower. In 2000/2001 the transition
period ended, since then the regulated rent system of East and West Germany are identical and the level of
rents in East Germany are roughly comparable to other areas in West Germany.
19Unfortunately, price level data is not available for these CPI categories.
121992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Fooda -1.1 -0.6 0.0 -0.6 -0.3 0.2 0.3 -0.3 0.1 1.6
Clothing/
shoes -1.7 -1.6 -0.8 -0.8 -0.5 -0.4 -0.1 -0.5 -1.2 -1.5
Utilities 73.9 33.9 3.3 0.5 2.5 0.9 0.1 0.0 -0.3 0.7
Furniture -1.0 -1.1 -1.1 -0.7 -0.4 -0.2 -0.5 -0.1 -0.4 -0.4
Health
services 26.2 12.4 9.1 2.5 -1.6 9.0 4.2 -5.4 0.9 2.3
Trans-
portation 1.8 1.0 -0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.2
Culture -1.8 1.9 1.7 1.4 0.4 0.9 0.4 -0.2 0.3 0.6
Education 24.3 16.2 6.3 4.7 2.4 5.8 -2.5 -3.0 1.2 3.8
Hotels/
Restaurants 3.0 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 -0.4 -0.1
Other 1.5 3.0 2.2 0.8 0.9 0.2 0.3 -0.1 -0.3 0.1
Source: Own calculations
aIncluding nonalcoholic beverages
Table 6: Yearly inﬂation differentials between East and West Germany for selected CPI
components
inﬂation differential in the accession countries. In what follows we estimate the effect
of EMU accession on price level differences between the current and the future EMU
members.
According to Eurostat, price levels in the candidate countries are approximately 40-
65% of the price level prevailing in the European Union. This illustrates the potential
for price level adjustments, although the channel through which this will come about
is not entirely clear. To compute the impact of adjustment of aggregate price levels
on inﬂation rates in current and future EMU members we need information about the
magnitude of the expected price adjustment and the speed of the adjustment:
• First, we need to determine the degree of price level convergence compatible
with convergence of inﬂation rates. We deﬁne this level as follows: price level
convergence is achieved if trend inﬂation rates in the current and future EMU
members are not systematically different.
• Second, we have to make an assumption about the speed of price level conver-
gence, i.e. about the time frame during which the adjustment will take place.
4.1 How much and how fast will price levels converge?
1 How much convergence of price levels can we expect?
To make assumptions about both issues we ﬁrst compare the German evidence to ev-














Total spread within EMU (in %) 60.7 57.0
Max. deviation from EU15 average (in %) 38.3 35.3
Source: Eurostat and own calculations
Table 7: Relative price level data for the euro area
within monetary unions, Nenna (2001) shows that differences in price levels among
Italian cities of more than 15 percent may persist over long time horizons. Data from
the US point to similar magnitudes.20 The differences within the euro area are even
larger: table 7 indicates that within the euro area price level differences can be up to
60% and the maximum deviation from the EU15 price level amounts to roughly 38%.21
The thick line in ﬁgure 4 displays the unweighted standard deviation of price levels in
the euro area. From 1995 to 1997 a downward trend is observable, which temporarily
stalled during the run-up to EMU in the late 1990s: the need to fulﬁl the Maastricht
inﬂation criterion reduced inﬂation rate dispersion and has thereby prevented price lev-
els from converging. Since the start of EMU in 1999 the standard deviation has again
started to decrease (albeit at a much slower speed), which indicates that it is too early
to say to what extent these differences will eventually persist, as we might suspect that
the process of price level convergence is not ﬁnished yet.22
In other words, available empirical evidence from other currency areas is not con-
clusive in the sense that the degree of price level dispersion within currency areas can
vary substantially. Therefore we have to make an assumption about what we can ex-
pect in terms of price level convergence. In order to set a ‘target value’ for price level
convergence of the candidate countries, it is interesting to note that Beck and Weber
(2001) have found evidence that EMU has drastically reduced inter-European price dis-
20See e.g. the ACCRA Cost of Living Index, according to which the costs of living (All Items index)
between US cities can differ by more than 15%.
21When Portual and Spain entered the EU their price level were 60% and 72%, respectively (European
Commission, 2003)). However, at that time they could use autonomous monetary policy.
22Eurostat price level data for 2002 are not yet available. The fact that price level differences within the
euro area are considerably larger than within Germany is not very surprising, given different national product
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Figure 4: Price level dispersion across the euro area and the candidate countries
persion, although national borders and distance continue to be important determinants
of relative price volatility.
We base our calculations on a ‘best case’ scenario: We assume that if the candidate
countries join the EMU, most impediments to price level convergence are identical to
those for the current members of the EMU. Therefore, we choose the country with the
lowest price level in the euro area as benchmark and postulate that – over the medium
term – the gap between the price level of the accession countries and the EU average
will on average not exceed the current gap between the ‘cheapest’ EMU member and
the respective average price level.
At present the country with the lowest price level within EMU is Portugal. There-
fore, regarding the degree of price convergence we postulate:
Assumption 1
We assume that price levels in the accession countries will converge to the price level
of Portugal in 2001 (the latest year for which we have euro area price level data), i.e.
to about 74% of EU15 prices.
2 How fast will price levels convergence?
Next, we have to make an assumption about the speed of price level adjustments. Ac-
cording to the PPP literature deviations from the law of one price can be very persistent,
Cecchetti et al (2000) estimate that half-lives of deviations from the law of one price
15can last for up to nine years. However, Imbs et al. (2002) have challenged this view,
claiming that half-lives of deviations of CPI components are varying and are on average
considerably shorter than for the aggregate CPI. Ortega (2003) makes the distinction
between tradable and nontradables goods and ﬁnds that half-lives of deviations from
the law of one price between euro area economies are on average between 4 and 5
years. This is in line with our results for Germany of the last section.
What does this imply for convergence of price levels in an enlarged EMU? Ger-
many probably fulﬁls more of the Optimal Currency Area criteria than the enlarged
EMU, such as free migration of labour (not hampered by different languages!) and
arbitrage is not hampered by different product regulations etc. Based on these con-
siderations we might expect that in Germany price levels converged faster to levels
compatible with convergence of inﬂation rates than it will happen in an enlarged EMU.
To be consistent with the evidence from previous studies, we have decided to base
our calculations for EMU enlargement on three scenarios:
Assumption 2
We assume that price levels in the candidate countries will converge linearly to levels
similar to Portugal in 5 years (fast convergence), in 10 years (medium convergence)
and 20 years (slow convergence). This corresponds to half-lives of shocks of 2.5, 5 and
10 years, respectively.
3 How realistic are the assumptions we make?
To evaluate how realistic the assumption about the speed of convergence and the ex-
pected degree of price convergence are, we look at actual inﬂation and price level data
for the candidate countries. Current price levels of the candidate countries are given in
table 8. We observe that at present more than half of the candidate countries have price
levels below 50% of the EU15 average.
To evaluate the consequence of the two assumptions we have made and to check
how realistic these assumptions are, we compute future price levels of the candidate
countries in 5, 10 and 20 years, based on their past inﬂation performance. The ﬁrst
column in table 9 shows price levels for the EU15, Portugal and the candidate coun-
tries. The second column provides average inﬂation rates over the past ﬁve years. The
remaining columns show calculations of price levels in 5, 10 and 20 years, provided
that inﬂation rates in the candidate countries remain at the same level as in the past ﬁve
years. We see that based on part performance half of the candidate countries would
have price levels exceeding those of Portugal within a period of 10 years, after 20
years only Latvia and Lithuania – both countries with very low inﬂation rates over the
past 5 years – would still be ‘cheaper’ than the ‘cheapest’ EMU country.
European Commission (2003) shows that from 1999 to 2001 the price dispersion in
EU25 has been reduced from 27.2% to 25.6%, while during the same period the price
16Price level Deviation from EU15-average
Bulgaria 39.2 60.8








Slovac Republic 42.1 57.9
(Unweighted) average cand. countries 49.7 50.3
EU15 Average 100.0 -
Portugal 73.9 26.1
Source: Eurostat and own calculations
Table 8: Price levels in the candidate countries in 2001
dispersion in EU15 has remained stable. They conclude that price convergence might
proceed ‘very quickly’. They also show that experience of past enlargement supports
our assumption that convergence largely occurs in the new members, not in the old
ones.
To summarise, the evidence of table 9 suggests that the assumptions we make are
relatively benign in the sense that available data of the candidate countries rather points
to faster price level convergence that we assume. In other words, our results are prob-
ably more likely to be biased downwards than upwards.
4.2 The effect of EMU enlargement on inﬂation in the current and
future EMU members
Using the ﬁgures from table 8 we can compute the trend inﬂation differential in the
candidate countries relative to the current euro area, if their price levels were to con-
verge to the level of Portugal in 5, 10 or 20 years. The results are given in table 10.
They can be regarded as a rough approximation of the inﬂationary pressure in the can-
didate countries, resulting from price level convergence and under the assumption that
nominal adjustment of exchange rates is not possible.
As these ﬁgures are trend inﬂation differentials, we can compute actual inﬂation
rates by adding the trend differentials to the average inﬂation rate of the currency union.
Assuming that on average European inﬂation rates will not exceed the ECB’s deﬁnition
of price stability, the inﬂation rate in each country can be estimated by adding the cor-
responding value of table 10 to the 2% value the ECB considers as consistent with price
stability. The interpretation is as follows: under the ‘medium convergence’ scenario,
Poland, for instance, will for a period of 10 years have inﬂation rates of about 3.9%
17Average inﬂation Price level Price level Price level Price level
last 5 years today in 5 years in 10 years in 20 years
EU 15 2.0a 100.0 110.4 121.9 148.6
Portugal 2.0a 73.9 81.6 90.1 109.8
Bulgaria 13.2 39.2 72.7 134.9 464.3
Czech Rep. 4.3 46.9 57.9 71.5 108.9
Estonia 5.0 51.2 65.5 83.6 136.6
Hungary 9.7 48.7 77.5 123.2 311.5
Latvia 1.7 47.9 52.0 56.5 66.7
Lithuania 2.7 52.1 59.6 68.1 89.0
Poland 7.3 60.9 86.6 123.1 248.6
Rumania 22.8b 41.1 114.9 320.7 2501.1
Slovenia 7.8 66.6 96.9 141.2 299.6
Slovac Rep. 8.0 42.1 61.7 90.4 194.4
Source: Own calculations
aFor the calculations we set inﬂation in the EU15 and Portugal to 2%.
bThe average inﬂation rate over the last 5 years was 42.6%, but with a declining trend. To not further
inﬂate the estimates for Rumania, we have decided to base our calculations on the average inﬂation rate in
2002.
Table 9: Projected price levels in the accession countries, based on past 5-year inﬂation
averages
(or 1.9% above the level the ECB considers consistent with price stability). These re-
sults indicate that relatively high inﬂation rates in the candidate countries might occur
(under the scenario of ‘medium’ price adjustment, for instance, all but two candidate
countries will experience inﬂation rates above 5% for a period of 10 years). Note, how-
ever, that actual inﬂation rates in the accession countries could, of course, deviate from
these trend values, due to external shocks etc.23
Based on these ﬁgures we can compute the effect of quick accession on inﬂation
for the enlarged EMU. We have calculated a baseline scenario where the candidate
countries join EMU except for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Rumania, as these
countries have indicated that they do not aim to introduce the common currency be-
fore 2007. In an alternative scenario we have assumed that all candidate countries
join EMU. Furthermore, we have assumed that the inﬂation rates in the current euro
area will average 2%, whereas inﬂation rates in the candidate countries are were deter-
mined by adding the trend inﬂation differential implied by table 3 to the 2 inﬂation rate
compatible with the ECB’s deﬁnition of price stability. In other words, the only factor
driving inﬂation rates in the candidate countries is the convergence of their price levels.
As can be seen in the ﬁrst row of table 11 inﬂation in the enlarged EMU could reach
levels between 2.1 and 2.3 percent.24 The second row computes inﬂation rates in the
23Our estimates for the Czech Republic are slightly higher than those of Cih´ ak and Holub (2001), who
estimate that inﬂation rates could reach levels of 2.7 to 4.7 percent.
24Note these ﬁgures are pure trend inﬂation rates, i.e. abstracting from any cyclical factors.
18Fast convergence Medium convergence Slow convergence
Bulgaria 13.5 6.6 3.2
Czech Republic 9.5 4.6 2.3
Estonia 7.6 3.7 1.8
Hungary 8.7 4.3 2.1
Latvia 9.1 4.4 2.2
Lithuania 7.2 3.6 1.8
Poland 3.9 1.9 1.0
Rumania 12.4 6.0 3.0
Slovenia 2.1 1.1 0.5
Slovac Republic 11.9 5.8 2.9
Total 7.1 3.5 1.7
Source: Eurostat and own calculations
Table 10: Trend inﬂation differentials in the candidate countries
current euro area members, provided that inﬂation in an enlarged EMU is maintained at
2 percent and inﬂation rates in the candidate countries are subject to the trend inﬂation
differential suggested by table 3. We see that the faster price level convergence unfolds,
the higher the need for inﬂation rates in the current EMU members to be below 2
percent (e.g. in the medium convergence scenario inﬂation in the euro area need not
exceed 1.9% for enlarged EMU inﬂation to remain below 2%). In the most extreme
case of rapid price level adjustment, inﬂation rates in the current EMU should for a
period of 5 years be about 0.3 percentage points below the current maximum inﬂation
rate considered to be consistent with price stability of 2% (the baseline scenario). In the
alternative scenario (i.e. without Bulgaria, Rumania and the Czech Republic) inﬂation
rates in the current euro area should not exceed 1.5% in order not to violate the ECB’s
deﬁnition of price stability.
Overall, the effect of price level adjustment on trend inﬂation in the euro area is
estimated to be relatively small (albeit not negligible), provided the adjustment pro-
cess does not unfold too quickly. However, relatively high trend inﬂation rates in the
accession countries are likely to prevail.
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
All our calculations assume a constant relationship between GDP of the current and
the future EMU members. Should the candidate countries grow faster than the current
EMU members, our estimates of inﬂation for the euro area are likely to be too low, as
the economic weight of candidate countries, relative to the current EMU members, will
increase: if, for instance, we increase the weight of the accession countries, relative
to the current euro area, by 20%, inﬂation rates in the current EMU would have to
decrease from 1.7% to 1.4% in the fast convergence scenario and from 1.9% to 1.7%




Inﬂation in enlarged EMUa 2.3 2.2 2.1
Inﬂation rates in EU12 if enlarged
EMU inﬂation equals 2%
1.7 1.9 1.9
Alternative scenario:
Inﬂation rates in enlarged EMUa 2.4 2.2 2.1
Inﬂation rates in EU12 if enlarged
EMU inﬂation equals 2%
1.5 1.8 1.9
Source: Own calculations
aInﬂation for the current EMU members is assumed to be 2% and inﬂation rates in the accession countries
are based on table 10
Table 11: Effect of EMU enlargement on euro area inﬂation
Furthermore, we have assumed linear price level convergence. If convergence is
increasing in the differences (i.e. if the price level differences decrease exponentially),
higher initial inﬂation differentials can be expected. If prices for tradable goods rise
in the accession countries, this can lead to losses in competitiveness; moreover high
inﬂation in the accession countries reduces their citizen’s purchasing power, potentially
leading to high costs of price level adjustment at the individual agent’s level.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have analysed price developments in a monetary union. We establish
two main ﬁndings: ﬁrst, using a theoretical model we showed that if two countries
with considerable initial differences in price levels and economic size form a mon-
etary union, in the presence of downward rigidities the optimal path for price level
convergence is not symmetrical. In the model we have assumed that the speed of price
adjustment in both countries is equal and we did not further consider differences in
monetary transmission, different types of rigidities etc. The model shows that if con-
vergence to a lower price level would imply high output losses in the country with the
higher price level, the central bank should allow relatively high inﬂation in the country
with initially low prices.
Second, evidence from the euro area suggests that differences in price levels can be
relatively large and persistent. This indicates that price level convergence in the EMU
accession countries can be very long lasting. Using data from the German reuniﬁcation
we have made assumptions about the degree of price level convergence we can expect
in Europe, and the speed of convergence. Then, our results show that inﬂation rates in
the accession countries could be relatively high, whereas the impact on the current euro
area members is likely to be small (though not negligible). At present we have aimed to
20based our calculations on relatively ‘conservative’ estimates for all accession countries
as a whole in order not to overstate the effect. We did not allow for country-speciﬁc
factors, but have simply assumed that all countries will converge with the same speed.
It remains the task for future research to allow different speeds of adjustment, based
e.g. on country-speciﬁc information about the ﬂexiblity of labour and product markets.
At this point we have to stress that we have treated all candidate countries equally
in the theoretical and the empirical analysis. Evidently, in reality e.g. the degree of
rigidities varies across the candidate countries, which implies that some will converge
faster than others. Therefore, the policy recommendations regarding e.g. the transition
periodmay varyacrosscountries. Havingthese considerations inmind, the generalpic-
ture that emerges is as follows: To foster price level adjustment prior to EMU accession
a ‘controlled’ real appreciation of the candidate countries is needed. This can basically
happen via two channels: ﬁrst, rising product prices in the candidate countries, second
via a nominal appreciation of the candidate countries’ exchange rates.
European monetary policy must always focus on the entire currency area. Once
the candidate countries have adopted the euro, their special situation can no longer be
accounted for. Therefore, our results may have implications regarding the timing of the
entry to EMU. Overall, the following conclusion emerges: to smooth the adjustment
process it may be in the interest of the accession countries not to ﬁx their exchange
rate too early. Instead, by retaining monetary policy autonomy for a prolonged tran-
sition period they might be able to avoid high inﬂation rates as a result of price level
adjustment once they have joined EMU.
Appendix A: The German reuniﬁcation
After the Second World War, Germany was divided into West Germany, which imple-
mented a market economy, and East Germany, which was essentially a planned econ-
omy of the Soviet type. Until the reuniﬁcation one the main pre-requisites for the law
of one price to hold was violated: trade was seriously hampered by the existence of two
different political regimes. As a result, not only relative prices were heavily distorted
in East Germany prior to the reuniﬁcation,25 but also price levels were considerably
lower than in West Germany. This is reﬂected in bank exchange rates between the
Deutschmark and the East German Mark prior to the reuniﬁcation, which were about
12.5 West German Deutschmark in exchange for 100 East German Mark.26
East and West Germany entered a currency union on July 1st, 1990, when East
Germany ofﬁcially introduced the West German Deutschmark as legal tender . The ex-
25Relative prices were not based on scarcity of goods, but largely on political considerations. Basic goods
such as bread etc. were heavily subsidised, whereas ‘luxury goods’ (such as cars or TV sets) were largely
overpriced.
26See Deutsche Bundesbank, 1999, p. 23.
21change rate between both parts was set on the basis of political, not economic consider-
ations. As a result, the exchange rate set between Deutschmark and East German Mark
was 1:1, despite the advice of the Bundesbank, who had opted for a lower exchange
rate (for larger savings and debts a rate of 1:2 applied).27 As a result of this political
decision, the large price level differences between East and West Germany implied by
the bank exchange rates prior to the uniﬁcation were reduced, but not eliminated.28
Appendix B: A theoretical model of price and inﬂation
convergence
The model primarily serves to study the optimal path of price adjustment. Although we
want to capture the anticipated price dynamics following EMU enlargement as closely
as possible, we do not attempt to model the entire catching-up process.29
The euro area and the accession countries are described in a two-country model.
Differences between individual countries within each region may sometimes be sub-
stantial, butareignoredhere. However, weallowforsomedifferencesbetweenregions.
In the model, the euro area and the group of accession countries are characterised by
differences in size (the economy of the group of accession countries is small comared
to the euro area) and initial price levels (prices in the accession countries are lower).
The other model parameters are assumed to be equal for both regions: First, this sim-
plifying assumption helps to keep the attention to the asymmetries we want to focus
on. Second, it is not always clear how differences in economic structure would affect
the other model parameters (speed of price level adjustment and steepness of supply
curves). For instance, whereas the Polish economy is supposedly characterised by rel-
atively little ﬂexibility, the Estonian economy is said to be (much) more ﬂexible than
the euro area. For the model we therefore take as a starting point that the euro area and
the group of accession countries are asymmetric only in terms of economic size and
initial price level.
We assume two countries, A and B, of size k and 1−k respectively, where k < 1
2,
so that country A is the smaller country. Initially, country A has a lower price level:
27The question which exchange rate was most appropriate was widely-debated, as Bundesbank (1999)
shows. Among others, the then President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Karl-Otto P¨ ohl, did not support
the government’s decision of an exchange rate of 1:1 for wages and prices. As a consequence, once from
a central banker’s perspective the German reuniﬁcation was (technically) completed, he resigned (Marsh,
1992).
28This decision not only reduced price level differences, but also hampered the competitive position of
the East German economy. In what follows, however, we neglect this aspect and focus on the price develop-
ments.
29Obviously, chosing for a parsimonious model has a number of limitations, e.g. one of the sensitivity
checks of section 4.3 was to allow for higher growth in the accession countries. Our model cannot provide a
realistic source for a positive growth differential in the accession countries. But since our aim is to focus on
the price dynamics following EMU enlargement, we do not regard this as a major shortcoming.
22pA < pB.30 The two countries decide to form an economic and monetary union. As
a result, price levels start to converge. However, this does not happen overnight: the
literature suggests that price level adjustment is a gradual process.31 Here, we do not
specify the underlying mechanisms (Balassa-Samuelson effect, more effective goods
arbitrage). Instead, we restrict ourselves to a simple description of the path of price
adjustment towards the law of one price. In each period, the new price level in each
country depends on the price level in the previous period, the price difference with the
other country in the previous period and the monetary policy stance (which is assumed
to have an identical price impact in both regions). There is staggered price adjustment,

























The parameter α (0 < α < 1) can be interpreted as the speed of the price level adjust-
ment,33 mt is the change in the monetary aggregate (assumed to be fully controlled by
the central bank). To keep the model simple we have assumed similar speed of price
adjustment in both countries (allowing for different α’s does not change our results
qualitatively). In the steady state, the equations above reduce to the law of one price.



















where πt is the inﬂation rate. The inﬂation difference between both countries is deter-
mined by the price level difference in the previous period and the adjustment speed,





30The initial price level difference is possible due to a lack of market integration at the outset.
31The assumption that price level adjustment occurs gradually is supported by several arguments: (1)
catching up in terms of productivity (which underlies Balassa-Samuelson effect) is estimated to take about
30 years: see Fischer, Sahay, V´ egh (1998); (2) remaining trade barriers prohibit full goods arbitrage.
32In Calvo (1983), there is staggered price adjustment in continuous time, where a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms
receives a price-change signal per unit of time. Here, a fraction α of ﬁrms change prices in each period.
One interpretation is that trade barriers are lifted sector by sector, affecting a share α of the economy in each
period.











t (immediate and full price level convergence); for 0 < α < 1, there
is gradual convergence to the law of one price (pA = pB).







t), j = A,B, (5)
with β > 0, so that output growth y depends negatively on real wage growth w−π.
Combining equation (5) with a simple optimal wage setting rule wj = E(π j) would
yield the familiar Lucas supply function (see Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, chapter 7,
page 358). 34 Here, we make the additional assumption that labour unions are unwill-
ing to accept a decline in nominal wages. This assumption is in line with the empirical
evidence on a downward nominal rigidity in wages presented by Akerlof, Dickens and
Perry (1996). Their claim has been disputed by Gordon (1996) and Mankiw (1996),
who argue forcefully that the ﬁndings by Akerlof et al. (1996) are subject to the Lu-
cas critique. Responding to this critique, using Swiss regional data, Fehr and Goette
(2000) provide evidence for the presence of a strong nominal wage rigidity in an en-
vironment with sustained low and negative nominal GDP growth, suggesting that the
validity of the claim by Akerlof may extend to such an environment. However, the
point here is not that wage rigidities are important, but that deﬂation can cause severe
output losses.35 We prefer to present a simple model, in which a downward rigidity is











, j = A,B.
In the absence of shocks and policy surprises, expected inﬂation equals realised inﬂa-









, j = A,B. (6)










34The wage setting rule wj = E(π j) can be derived in several ways. In Canzoneri and Henderson (1991,
chapter 1), employment depends on the real wage rate and wage setters minimise the variability of employ-
ment. This leads to a simple optimal wage setting rule, where wages are set equal to the expected price
level. In terms of growth rates, this implies that wage growth is set equal to the expected level of inﬂation,
i.e. wj = E(π j). An alternative approach would be to assume that workers minimise the expected square
deviation of real wage growth from the wage growth target, which is set equal to zero for simplicity. This
yields the same optimal wage rule. See for instance Cohen (1997).
35IMF (2002), p. 27, provides an overview over the degree of nominal rigidities in the euro area. We could
use a more elaborate model with nominal debt contracts or with a zero lower bound to nominal interest rates
to establish the same main point.
24The common central bank implements a single monetary policy for both countries. It
focuses on output growth and inﬂation in the entire currency area (y∗
t and π∗
t , respec-
tively). The central bank seeks to set an optimal monetary policy in each period by













with respect to its policy instrument mt, subject to equations (4), (5) and (6), where γ is
the relative weight assigned to the goal of price stability by the common central bank.












Combining this result with equation (4) yields the following path of price adjust-































Equation (11) shows that initial price level differences cause an upward bias in area-
wide inﬂation (i.e. π∗
t >0) under optimal monetary policy. The area-wide inﬂation rate
is increasing in the initial price level difference between both regions (pB
t−1 − pA
t−1).
Equations (9)-(11) also illustrate two main points:
• If the economic size of the accession countries (country A) is relatively small
compared to the current member states (country B) (k → 0), then it is optimal
from the common central bank’s point of view that the burden of price adjust-





t = 0; limk→0π∗
t = 0.
• If the output loss associated with deﬂation is high, the central bank will raise
area-wide inﬂation (and accept the loss related to a higher inﬂation rate in coun-
try A) in order to reduce the deﬂation rate in country B. Mathematically: the
higher β (i.e. the ﬂatter the slope of the aggregate supply curve), the higher the
area-wide inﬂation rate π∗.
36We can distinguish between several cases for the signs of πA
t and πB
t . However, it is straightforward to
show that only the case πA
t >0; πB
t <0 is consistent with the initial condition pA
0 < pB
0 and with the equations
above. This helps to simplify equation (6) in the main text.
25Appendix C: Data sources
Our data set consists of regional inﬂation time series for the period 1/1991-7/2002
for the Bundesl¨ ander Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen and Sachsen-
Anhalt (monthly data) and annual data for the period 1995-1997 and monthly data
for 1/1997-7/2002 for Thuringa. Data on sub-categories for Sachsen was provided
since 1995. The Statistisches Bundesamt provided inﬂation data for East and West
Germany for the period 1991-2002 (monthly data). We wish to thank all Statistische
Landes¨ amter.
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